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Abstract-Recently, there has been considerable interest in alternative stabilization programs in devel-
oping countries. This paper examines the possibility of implementing this type of program in a country 
that traditionally has had considerable difficulty in complying with International Monetary Fund 
programs. The macro-economic simulations of Jamaica's economy clearly show that successful supply-side 
policies could have mitigated the adverse income effects of stabilization associated with the standard IMF 
approach to stabilization. 
INTRODUCTION 
There has been only limited formal quantitative 
analysis of the effects that alternative stabilization 
programs may have on the Jamaican economy. This, 
of course, has considerable implications for the Inter-
national Monetary Fund's lending operations in 
Jamaica since relationships such as that between 
the money supply and growth are implicit in the 
stabilization programs that have been agreed to by 
the Jamaican government. 
Evaluation of the IMF programs in Jamaica, to-
gether with the criticisms of these efforts, requires a 
macro-economic model with a framework where 
there is a fairly well-defined relationship between 
money, the balance of payments and domestic prices, 
in which the supply of and demand for money play 
a central linking role. The effects of policies on the 
real sector should also be treated explicitly. 
Once a model of the economy has been specified, 
a computer simulation can be used to determine and 
compare the results of the different IMF or govern-
ment policies. Presumably, with this information one 
could choose a policy which, though not necessarily 
optimal, is better than alternative policy packages. 
The approach developed below is that of optimal 
control. The formulation of short-term stabilization 
policy in Jamaica seems particularly amenalile to 
optimal control. A goal of this paper will be to show 
that if one can work with a linear or linearized 
econometric model of the Jamaican economy, to-
gether with a quadratic cost function, then optimal 
control theory can provide a viable tool for: (1) 
analyzing and understanding the dynamic properties 
of the Jamaican economy; (2) formulating sta-
bilization policies based on the model; (3) better 
understanding in a quantitative way the tradeoffs that 
the Jamaican economic policy-maker and IMF were 
faced with during the late 1970s. 
SPECIFICATION OF TIIE MODEL 
The estimated model contains 13 behavioral equa-
tions. Such simplicity was dictated mainly by a desire 
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to focus on the general aspects of the issues consid-
ered here and to develop an analysis that is applicable 
specifically to the Jamaican economy [l]. Any at-
tempt to construct a more disaggregated model for 
the country would immediately run into the con-
straints of the limited availability of data [2]. 
is: 
Essentially, this model describes an economy that 
(1) small relative to the rest of the world; 
(2) open to international trade and financial flows; 
(3) maintaining a pegged exchange rate-this does 
not mean that the exchange rate cannot be altered, 
but only that it is policy determined, and 
(4) characterized by a relatively underdeveloped 
financial sector. This specifically implies that the 
number of financial assets that could substitute for 
money holdings is very limited, and/or that the 
authorities control the interest rates of those assets 
that are available. 
The stochastic equations of the model explain 
inflation, the overall balance of payments, the fiscal 
budget (i.e. government expenditure and revenues), 
real output, money supply, domestic credit, the cur-
rent account, government and private sector con-
sumption and investment. 
INFLATION 
The specification for price changes is an extension 
of the monetary disequilibrium model of Goldman (3] 
to an open economy. The Jamaican rate of inflation 
relative to the world rate of price increase is assumed 
to be positively related to the excesss supply of real 
money balances, and a function of the deviation of 
domestic prices from their equilibrium (purchasing 
power parity) level. Formally, the specification is 
written: 
INFC = a 1 [MIPL - MIP"] 
-a2 [CPIL-EXAE·USCPI-b0] 
+a3 [GEXAE· USCPI] + C1 (1) 
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where: 
INFC =the Jamaican rate of inflation (consumer 
price index). 
EXAE = Jamaican exchange rate in units of 
Jamaican dollars per U.S. dollar. 
USCPE = United States consumer price index. 
MIP = stock of real money balances (MI) 
deflated by the Jamaican consumer price 
index. 
L =lagged one year. 
GEXAE = the rate of growth of EXAE. 
The superscript denotes demand. 
~~ t~e simplifying assumption that the country's 
eqwhbnum exchange rate did not change secularly, 
h0 may be used as a parameter rather than varying 
over time. If there is no excess demand for real money 
balances and domestic prices are equal to their 
equilibrium level h0, then with the exchange rate fixed, 
the rate of Jamaican inflation will be equal to the rate 
of inflation prevailing in the United States (the 
country's major trading partner). This result of 
course assumes that Jamaican policy-makers always 
attempt to keep their country's prices in line with 
those charged in the United States. 
Divergences from this equilibrium relationship can 
arise from two sources: 
(I) any expansion of the money stock that results 
in an excess supply of real money balances will (in the 
next period) create inflationary pressures that tend to 
eliminate the disequilibrium in the money market; 
(~). if. domestic prices are pushed away from the 
~qwhbn.um l~vel, for whatever reason, they will move 
m the direction that restores the relationship. 
In a sense, the second term in eqn (I) represents a 
type of "catch up" effect to any erosion that may 
occur in the country's international competitiveness. 
Feeding into eqn (I) is the stock demand for real 
money balances. Here we follow the standard litera-
ture [4] in relating money demand to received income 
(GDPNP) and to the expected rate of inflation 
(INFCE). 
M;P" = h1 + a4GDPNP - a51NFCE (2) 
This formulation which is typically used for devel-
oping countries [5], differs from theoretical models in 
excluding the rates of interest from other.financial 
assets from affecting money demand. This follows 
directly from the aforementioned assumption regard-
ing the paucity of financial alternatives to money in 
Jamaica. The relevant substitution in the country is, 
therefore, between money and goods or real assets 
with the opportunity cost being the expected rate of 
inflation. 
Substituting eqn (2) into eqn (1) leads to the 
equation in its estimating form: 
INFC = (a2h0 - a1h1) 
+a1 [MiPL - a4GDPNP + a5INFCE] 
-a2 [CPIL-EXAE- USCPIL] 
+a3 [GEXAE + GUSCPI] + C1 (3) 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The over~ll balance of payments, as represented by 
the change m the stock of international reserves (in 
term~ of domestic currency) is specified as a positive 
function of the excess demand for nominal money 
balances and a negative function of the deviation of 
the domestic price level from its purchasing power 
parity equilibrium. 
DR - DEXAE = a6 [Mid - MIL] 
-a7 [CPIL- EXAEL· USCPIL]-h0 (4) 
, where: 
DR= the change in the net stock of international 
reserves. 
MI= nominal stock of narrow money. 
In eqn (4) variations in the domestic currency value 
of foreign exchange reserves that are due solely to 
exch~nge rate movements are eliminated by sub-
tractmg the percentage change in the exchange rate 
from the left hand side of the equation. (This has to 
be done because such variation changes do not affect 
the domestic money stock or the excess demand for 
money.) 
Equation (4) is a dynamic version of models in the 
tradition of th~ monetary approach to the balance of 
payments and, following that literature, it does not 
distinguish between the current capital accounts of 
the balance of payments. It makes no prediction as 
to whether domestic residents rid themselves of excess 
money balances by increasing expenditure (i.e. ab-
sorption) relative to output, or by purchasing 
financial assets abroad. 
The second term, which says that the balance of 
payments will deteriorate when domestic prices in-
crease relative to foreign prices, does not reflect 
current account factors alone since such a decline 
in the country's competitive position may induce 
domestic asset holders to export capital on the 
expectation that the probability of a future deval-
uation of the (fixed) exchange rate has increased [6]. 
Thus, the present treatment of the overall balance of 
payments in a single equation is consistent with our 
treatment of domestic financial markets. 
Most empirical applications of the monetary ap-
proach to the balance of payments assume that the 
change in a country's international reserves is exactly 
equal to the difference between the flow demand for 
money and the fl.ow supply of domestically created 
money. This standard assumption does not seem very 
realistic in the context of Jamaica, where the degree 
of international mobility of goods and assets may not 
be sufficient to allow an excess supply of money to be 
offset fully and instantaneously by balance of pay-
ments leakages. 
The equation that is specified here for international 
reserves is consistent with the broad framework of the 
monetary approach, but it includes a degree of 
dynamic adjustment as measured by the parameter 
a6• Thus, it allows for inertia in the response of 
.reserve flows to monetary disequilibrium in the short 
run, while still retaining the feature that the effect of 
an expansion in domestic credit on the money stock 
is completely offset in the long run. 
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Substituting for the nominal demand for money 
gives: 
Desired nominal revenues are assumed to be a 
function of nominal income. 
GR* = b3 + a11 [GDPNP +CPI] (IO) DR= a6 [b1 + a4GDPNP - a5 INFCE +CPI - Ml] 
-a1 [CPIL - EXAEL - USCPIL-b0] Substituting from this equation for GR* in eqn (9) 
(S) gives: GEXAE 
GOVERNMENTSECI'OR 
Fiscal policy and the government's budgetary pos-
ition are modeled explicitly because of the crucial role 
that they play in the money supply process in Jamaica 
and in overall economic activity in the country. It is 
hypothesized that in most cases excess demand in the 
economy can be traced back to deficits of the public 
sector. Clearly, this assumption underlies the IMF's 
requirement in the late 1970s to reduce the fiscal 
deficit and limit credit from the Bank of Jamaica to 
the public sector. The causes of these effects and their 
impact on the economy are therefore important 
questions that need to be handled in any analysis 
where one must make recommendations about de-
sirable changes in domestic credit policy. 
The model of the government sector that we utilize 
assumes that nominal government expenditure ad-
justs proportionally to the difference between the 
authorities' target spending and the actual level of 
expenditure in the previous period (7]. 
GE= as [GE* - GEL] (6) 
where: 
GE and GE* are the actual and derived levels of 
nominal government expenditures, respectively 
and as is the coefficient of adjustment. 
The derived level of government expenditure is 
simply related to the level of nominal income. 
GR= a,ob3 + a1oau [GDPNP +CPI] 
+(I - a10) GRL (ll) 
REAL INCOME 
Reflecting the short term perspective of the applied 
IMF stabilization programs, the model focuses on 
determining the deviations of actual output from its 
full capacity level, rather than on capacity output 
itself. Since capacity output is treated as exogenous 
to the model, such factors as capital accumulation, 
population growth and technical progress are not 
considered here. However, because this model dis-
tinguished clearly between capacity output and cur-
rent output, it would not be difficult to extend it to 
allow for endogenous capacity growth if a more 
detailed analysis of the supply side of the economy 
were desired; for example, in the context of the 
programs after 1980 designed for purposes of struc-
tural adjustment. 
It is assumed that the rate of growth of output in 
Jamaica is positively related to: (l) the excess stock 
of real money balances, (2) the so-called output gap, 
represented here by the difference between normal 
capacity output and actual output of the period, and 
(3) the impact of the trend in real government 
expenditure on output. 
GDPNP = a12 [M2PL- M1P"] 
+a13 [GDPNP* - GDPNPL] 
+a14 [GEHEX] +Ci (12) 
GE* = b2 + C'9 [GDPNP +CPI] (7) where: 
Until 1972 it was probably reasonable to assume 
that in the long run the government wished to 
increase its expenditure in line with the growth of 
nominal income, and therefore one would expect a 
priori that the income elasticity (a9) would be equal 
or close to unity. Such a restriction would normally 
also be required to ensure that the overall model has 
a steady state solution when capacity income and 
foreign prices, or the exchange rate are allowed to 
change over time. This constraint is not imposed on 
the model during estimation, since there is no reason 
to suppose that it has held during the sample period, 
especially in light of the change in government prior-
ities during the Manley administration (1972-1980). 
Substituting eqn (7) in eqn (6) and solving for the 
level of government expenditure one obtains: 
GE= asb2 + asa9 [GDPNP +CPI] 
+ (I - as) GEL (8) 
As with expenditure nominal government revenues 
(GR) are assumed to adjust to the difference between 
planned revenues (GR*) and actual revenues ob-
tained in the previous period. 
DGR = a 10[GR * - GRL] (9) 
GDPNP =real gross domestic product M2P =real 
stock of broad money (M2) GEHEX =the rate of 
growth in real government expenditure 1960-1980. 
GDPNP is the normal level of output. This latter 




YHT =the linear trend in GDPNP. It follows that: 
YHTE = GDPNP* - GDPNPL (14) 
It is assumed that the sign on the trend in govern-
ment expenditures is positive (along Keynesian lines). 
However, it should be noted that the expansion in 
government expenditures which accompanied the 
deflationary monetary policies in the late 1970s did 
not generate adequate investment while the structure 
of revenue of expenditure and of the government debt 
which evolved created additional difficulties. The 
burden of maintaining economic activity was largely 
on government expenditure at a time when revenues 
were constrained. 
Brown feels that the overall rate of expansion of 
government expenditures was "not in itself the main 
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source of difficulty, particularly since an expan-
sionary fiscal program was necessary to insulate the 
domestic economy from the deflationary policies 
addressed to the balance of payments. Specific diffi-
culties arose from the fact that the financing of this 
expenditure increasingly relied on central bank 
financing, on extending the scope of indirect· taxes, 
and on external short term loans" [8]. 
This formulation assumes that any disequilibrium 
in the money market will result in a temporary 
expansion of real income and/or, conversely, any 
tightening of monetary policy that results in a fall in 
real money balances will have output consequences 
through hoarding effects on the level of real expendi-
ture. The degree to which this occurs is measured b7 
the parameter 0 12 • While there are no strong the<;>ret1-
cal priors on the size of this parameter, convention~! 
wisdom would probably tend to argue that 1t 
would be small. However, this is clearly an empirical 
question. . 
Substituting for M~ and GDPNP* m eqn (12) 
yields: 
GDPNP = 0 12 [-b1 + M2PL - o4GDPNP 
+o5INFCE] + 0 13 [YHTE] 
+[GEHEX] + C2 (15) 
Or, in terms of the level of real income: 
(I + o12o4)GNPNP 
= od-b + M2PLTo51NFCE] 
+ o13 [YHTE] + 0 13 [GEHEX] + C2 (16) 
EXPECTED INFLATION 
The expected rate of inflation follows the formu-
lation of Harberger [9] and is equal to the current rate 
of inflation minus that of the prior year, or: 
INFCE = INFC - INFCL (17) 
While this formulation is arbitrary and does not fit 
easily into the currently popular rational ex~ecta~i<;>ns 
framework [IO], it has the advantage of s1mphc1ty, 
given no other data series for Jamaica [11]. 
DOMESTIC CREDIT AND MONEY SUPPLY 
Generally speaking, in an open economy such as 
Jamaica's, the domestic component of th! money 
stock-the level of domestic credit extended by the 
banking system-is taken to be the basic monetary 
tool. However, any model for a developing country 
must recognize the linkage that exists between 
government fiscal operations . and ~h~ supply of 
money. For this reason, domestic credit 1s assumed to 
be determined endogenously. More specifically, 
changes in domestic credit (DDC) can take place 
through changes in the banking system's claims on 
the government (DGG) and on the private sector 
(DCP), that is: 
DDC = DCG + DCP, or (18) 
DDC = DCG + DCP + DCL (19) 
If all changes in claims on the government are a 
reflection of the fiscal deficit of the government, then 
eqn (19) can be written as: 
DC +GE-GR+DCP+DCL (20) 
In this formulation, any expansion of the fiscal deficit 
results in an equivalent increase in the stock of 
domestic credit. This simply assumes that the govern-
ment finances its deficit by borrowing from the 
banking system, using its cash balances held with 
banks or by borrowing abroad and converting the 
proceeds into domestic currency. Only if the govern-
ment were able to borrow domestically from the 
non-bank sector-say by selling bonds or bills-
would this identity break down. It is obvious that 
here the assumption of the lack of a sufficiently 
developed domestic market for securities, govern-
ment or otherwise, becomes crucial. Despite 
Jamaica's recent progress in the development of these 
markets, the scope for such borrowing is fairly 
limited thereby confirming the appropriateness of the 
definition contained in eqn (20). 
The supply of money (M2}-broadly defined to 
include current demand deposits and time and sav-
ings deposits-is identically equal to the net stock of 
international reserves (in domestic currency terms) 
and the level of net domestic credit extended by the 
banking system: 
M2 = R+DC (21) 
For estimation purposes, the identities of domestic 
credit and the money supply were estimated using the 
following formulation: 
DC = o15GE - o16GR + o17DCP + o18DCL (22) 
and for the money supply: 
o19M1 = M1L + o20 [EXAE + GRL] 
- o2i [EXAEL + RL] + 0 22DC 
-o23DCL+b5 
o24M2 = M2L + o25 [EXAE + R] 
- o26[EXAEL + RL] 
THE CURRENT ACCOUNT 
(23) 
(24) 
Throughout most of the 1970s, a combination of 
events caused the international economic environ-
ment to become less conducive to stable growth for 
the country, and in particular made its balance of 
payments adjustment much more difficult. T~e sub-
stantial fluctuations in the world market pnces of 
primary commodities, the sharp increases in t~e p~ce . 
of energy products, the slowdown of economic activ-
ity in the industrial countries, and the rise in real 
interest rates toward the end of the period were all 
major contributors to the serious deterioration in the 
country's current account position. At the same time, 
domestic developments in the country played a 
significant role in exacerbating payments disequi-
librium. In particular, the government's inflationary 
demand-management policies-undoubtedly com-
bined with a relatively rigid exchange rate and 
restrictions on trade and payments-resulted in 
domestic demand oressures and a cumulative loss in 
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Table I. Jamaica: trends in investment, 1969-1976 
(Millions of Jamaican dollars) 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Gross fixed capital formation 315.3 367.l 356.0 366.8 448.2 478.2 609.6 450.8 
Gross accumulation 348.9. 369.2 411.5 393.4 541.8 525.0 670.1 494.4 
Increase in stocks 33.6 2.1 55.5 26.6 93.6 47.0 60.5 43.6 
Government investment 12.4 15.8 18.2 23.4 26.1 36.5 58.1 69.1 
Private investment 302.9 35.J.3 337.8 343.4 422.I 441.7 551.5 381.7 
(% of gross domestic product) 
Gross fixed capital formation 31.8 31.4 27.8 25.5 25.8 22.0 23.4 16.6 
Gross accumulation 35.2 31.6 32.2 27.3 31.2 24.2 25.7 18.2 
Increase in stocks 3.4 0.2 4.3 1.9 5.4 2.2 2.3 1.6 
Government investment 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.7 2.2 2.5 
Private investment 30.5 30.2 26.4 23.9 24.3 20.4 21.1 14.1 
Source: Department of Statistics. National Income and Product, various issues. 
international competitiveness that also gave rise to 
current account difficulties. 
With respect to the terms of trade, what Jamaica 
apparently lost from the inflation of oil and non-oil 
prices appears to have been gained bac.k from higher 
bauxite, alumina and sugar so that the terms of 
trade generally did not turn against her over this 
period [12]. 
Based on the above considerations of the likely 
internal and external factors that have effefted 
Jamaica's balance of payments, the following 
equation was specified [13) for estimating the current 
account: 
DCA = a29 TOT + a3GYIC 
- a31RRI - a32RER - a33GEHTE (25) 
where 
DCA = Changes in the current account balance 
(other measures of the balances of payments in-
cluded; DT A = changes in the trade account; 
DCAA = changes in the trade plus service 
accounts; DCAB =CAA+ changes in private 
transfers-excluding official transfers). TOT= 
terms of trade. GYIC =Growth of real GNP in 
the industrial countries. RRI = Real foreign inter-
est rate. RER = Real effective exchange rate. 
GEHTE = Deviations from the linear trend of 
real government expenditures. 
Equation (24) can be viewed as an unrestricted 
reduced form relationship that is derived from a 
structural model of the components of the current 
account-imports and net service paymen~. The 
chief advantage of this formulation is that it allows 
separate identification of the relative importance of 
external factors TOT, GYIC and RRI from domestic 
factors RER and GEHTE. 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT ' 
Private investment (Tables 1 and 2) is assumed to 
be positively affected by: (1) an accelerator mech-
anism (depicted by the change in real GDP 
(DGDPNP); (2) the activity of the public sector (both 
directly through "crowding out" and indirectly 
through effecting the investment climate); and (3) 
inflationary expectations. 
Clearly private investment is affected by inflows of 
capital. Foreign private capital inflows have always 
played a key role in the balance of payments and 
capital formation in Jamaica [14). In the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, during a major expansion of the 
bauxite sector, net foreign capital inflows made up 
20-25% of all foreign exchange receipts and con-
tributed up to 30% of domestic capital formation. 
After the completion of these major investments in 
1971, foreign direct investment declined and by 1975 
there was a net capital outflow. One of the major 
reasons for the worsening balance of payments in 
1975 and 1976 was the precipitous drop in long term 
private net capital inflows from J$139 million in 1974 
to J$30.5 million in 1976. This reduction in private 
capital inflows was only partly offset by the growth 
. of official foreign borrowing on the Eurodollar mar-
kets between 1973 and 1976. 
It has been argued [15) that the decline in foreign 
financing in Jamaica after 1975 was mainly the result 
of domestic rather than external factors, in so far as 
the internal incentives offered to foreign investors 
were not sufficiently attractive from 1974 onwards 
Table 2. Jamaica: trends in investment, 1977-1982 
(Millions of Jamaican dollars) 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Gross fixed capital formation 349.5 498.9 748.2 690.1 954.3 1153.6 
Gross accumulation 365.1 568.7 813.6 737.2 1114.1 1155.8 
Increase in stocks 15.6 69.8 65.4 47.1 159.8 2.2 
Government investment 114.9 187.3 249.7 349.2 430.8 601.5 
Private investment 234.6 311.6 228.4 340.9 523.5 552.1 
(% of gross domestic product) 
Gross fixed capital formation 11.8 13.4 17.5 14.6 18.2 20.3 
Gross accumulation 12.4 15.2 19.l 15.6 21.3 20.4 
Increase in stocks 0.5 1.9 1.5 1.0 3.1 0.1 
Government investment 3.9 5.0 5.9 7.4 8.2 10.6 
Private investment 8.0 8.4 5.4 7.2 IO.O 9.7 
Source: Department of Statistics. National Income and Product. 
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and the social and political climate was a major 
disincentive to foreign capital. 
In addition to affecting foreign capital flows, the 
public sector in Jamaica has had a strong impact on 
savings investment decisions, both directly through 
the choice of public investment projects and indi-
rectly through the impact of its taxing, spending and 
domestic credit policies on decisions taken by the 
private sector. It has been shown [16) that unless the 
supply of foreign savings to the domestic economy is 
perfectly elastic, private sector capital formation and 
the growth of private sector potential output will be 
retarded by ceilings that hold real interest rates below 
their equilibrium levels, by taxes on savings, or 
increased public sector deficits. However, the effect of 
such policies on the growth of total potential output 
(including both the private and public sectors) de-
pends critically on what the authorities do with the 
funds that these policies put at their disposal. Many 
types of government policies may be easily justifiable 
in global terms, even if they tend to compress private 
sector fixed capital formation. For example, it may be 
argued that taxing or running deficits to finance 
public sector infrastructural investments, education 
and manpower training, etc. will yield external econ-
omies that increase the return on private investment 
and thus the rate of growth of total potential output. 
Even here, of course, taxing or deficit spending 
policies impose the usual dead-weight loss on the 
static efficiency of the saving-investment process. 
Here the net impact of the government budget 
seems to have been negative in that the government's 
deficit also contributed to crowding out of private 
investment. The deficit (in real terms) increased from 
1$41 million (4% of GNP) in 1976. Nominal central 
bank credit to the central government increased from 
1$4 million in 1971 to 1$402 million in 1977. Com-
mercial banks lending to the government increased 
rapidly as well, from 1$44 million (11 % of bank 
assets) in 1970 to 1$248 million (33% of bank assets) 
in 1977. 
Apart from causing inflation, this massive ex-
pansion of government debt displaced private 
sector debt, including that of productive enter-
prises. Government debt as a percentage of 
total debt rose from 11 % in 1970 to 50% in 
1977. Furthermore, the average ratio of taxes 
to GNP increased from 0.17 in 1970 to 0.28 in 
1977. Through its credit and fiscal operafions 
the Jamaican government succeeded in bidding 
away real resources on an increasing scale [17). 
The share of government in total consumption ex-
penditures rose form 17% in 1970 to 24% in 1977. 
No data is available on its share in total imports. 
However, the exemption of government transactions 
frbm the stringent import restrictions implies that 
government's share became larger. "In effect the 
government facilitated its own requirements by 
crowding out the import demands of the private 
sector" [18). 
Unfortunately, during this period public sector 
expenditures appear to have on the balance nega-
tively affected private investment. There were two 
main difficulties. One was the lack of appropriate 
functional distinction between public ownership as an 
objective of democratic socialist purpose and public 
ownership as a means of redistribution. 
While the political directorate clearly under-
stood the need to complement the new percep-
tion of the political framework by altering the 
economic power structure, the means to change 
were missing. As the decision-making process 
did not cohere, and as this was reinforced by 
political fragmentation, the practice of demo-
cratic socialism was more and more conducted 
within short run constraints oriented to short 
run objectives. Unfortunately, the need to em-
phasize appropriate investment policies was 
paramount, not only because of the attempt to 
change the political and economic direction. A 
focus on investment was particularly necessary 
at that time because this was the only means 
through which short run deflationary policies, 
such as were then in existence to protect the 
balance of payments can be made to com-
plement or at least not retard long run growth 
prospects [19). 
The second negative factor associated with govern-
ment expenditures was that these expenditures did 
not extend productive capacity nor did they induce 
private sector activity. Further, given the economic 
conditions of the period, the government budget in 
spite of continuous increases was simply not adequate 
for the traditional task of filling the gap left by 
private economic activity. The point is of some 
relevance for an appraisal of the period after 1976, 
when business economic activity declined even fur-
ther. "Given the basic structural characteristics of the 
economy, the traditional budget structure, whatever 
the increases, could not generate growth dynamic" 
[20). 
The impacts of government action on private in-
vestment are difficult to quantify. There was no 
significant relationship found between government 
investment and private investment. Consequently, the 
level of government consumption (GCNP) was as-
sumed to serve as a proxy for the total impact of 
government activity on private sector investment. 
Inflationary expectations for inventory and other 
anticipatory speculative gains were assumed to be 
proxied by the change in world market prices from 
the previous year to that of the prior period [21) 
(CPIWL). 
In summary, private investment was specified as: 
IPP = a34DGDPNP - a35GCNP + a36CPIWL. (26) 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 
Income redistribution and short term employment 
objectives rather than production objectives appear 
to have dominated government expenditure and sav-
ing (Tables 3 and 4) programs. Thus, basically non-
productive programs, such as the Special Employ-
ment Program introduced in 1972 as a temporary 
form of unemployment relief, grew throughout the 
1970s. "The trends in government consumption and 
the social welfare nature of many of the public 
programs indicate that the main effect of govern-
mental growth was the substitution of public con-
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Table 3. Jamaica: patterns of saving, 1969-1976 
(Millions of Jamaican dollars) 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Government saving 55.8 50.6 64.2 42.8 17.4 123.0 69.5 -24.2 
Private saving 190.2 241.0 79.1 233.7 362.9 262.6 370.3 212.7 
Depreciation (93.0) (117.0) (122.2) (144.0) (172.7) (204.9) (230.6) (248.3) 
Other (97.2) (124.0) (-43.1) (89.8) (190.7) (57.7) (139.7) (-35.6) 
Gross domestic savings 246.0 291.6 143.3 276.5 380.3 385.6 439.8 188.5 
Net saving 153.0 174.6 145.6 132.5. 207.6 180.7 209.2 -59.8 
Net borrowing from rest of world 106.1 85.1 148.2 122.3 168.2 174.8 225.6 302.2 
Net capital transfers from rest of world -3.2 -4.7 -4.5 -5.4 -6.7 -8.2 4.7 3.7 
(% of gross domestic product) 
Government saving 5.6 4.3 5.0 3.0 1.0 5.7 2.7 -0.9 
Private saving (total) 19.2 20.6 6.2 16.2 21.1 12.2 14.3 7.9 
Private saving (other) 9.8 10.6 -3.4 6.2 I I.I 2.7 5.4 -1.3 
Gross domestic savings 24.8 24.9 11.2 19.2 22.1 17.9 17.0 7.0 
Net saving 15.4 14.9 11.4 9.2 12.1 8.4 8.1 2.2 
Net borrowing from rest of world 10.7 7.3 11.6 8.5 9.8 8.1 8.7 11.2 
Source: Department of Statistics. National Income and Product, various issues. 
sumption and less productive public expenditures for 
more productive private expenditures. Bureaucratic 
growth through its resource allocative effect, further 
determined the productive capacity and performance 
of the economy" [22). 
In addition to the usual levels of real incomes 
(GDPNP) and negatively related to declines in wealth 
caused by domestic inflation (DCPI); or 
PCNP = a37GDPNP + a38GCNP - a39DCPI. (27) 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION 
AND INVESTMENT 
For purposes of model simulation real government 
expenditures (GEHEX) are taken as exogenous. 
Since the composition of public expenditures appears 
to be important in affecting both private con-
sumption and simply related to the trend in real 
government expenditures: 
GCNP = a40GEHEX (28) 
where 
GCNP = Government consumption 
IGP = a41GEHEX (29) 
where 
IGP =Government investment. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The model described in the previous sections was 
estimated using two stage least squares estimation 
technique [23). Several dummy variables were in-
cluded to take into account structural shifts caused 
by the oil price increases in the early 1970s, and for 
changes in political regimes during this period. For 
the oil price changes, DUMO = 0, 1953-1963 (years 
of pre-independence); 1, 1962-1972 (JLP adminis-
tration); 2, 1973-1980 (Manley PNP administration); 
and 3, 1981-1982 (Seaga JLP administration). 
As theoretically expected the results [24) (Table 5) 
indicate that an excess supply of real money balances 
results in an increase in the rate of inflation. The 
monetary theory to the balance of payments appears 
to explain quite well changes in reserves (DR). 
Not surprising is the strong negative impact of the 
trend in real government expenditures (GEHEX) on 
real income (GPNP). On the other hand, major 
determinants of real income are: (I) the difference 
between capacity; real income and the actual level; 
and (2) monetary disequilibrium. 
The current account balance appears to be affected 
by both internal (GEHTE) factors and external de-
velopment (GYICL) and DUMOA). Interestingly, 
there was a shift over time in the relative importance 
of internal and external factors with the lagged rate 
of growth in GNP in the industrial countries 
Table 4. Jamaica: patterns of saving, 1977-1982 
(Millions of Jamaican dollars) 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Government saving -91.9 -163.6 -63.2 -127.3 -195.1 -449.8 
Private saving 332.9 654.0 675.4 593.0 589.6 859.2 
Depreciation (284.2) (342.7) (393.7) (422.8) (427.6) (537.3) 
Other (48.7) (311.3) (287.1) (170.2) (162.0) (321.9) 
Gross domestic savings 241.0 490.4 612.2 465.7 394.5 409.4 
Net saving -43.2 147.7 218.5 42.5 -33.1 -127.9 
Net borrowing from rest of world 118.2 62.3 183.7 255.8 701.8 724.1 
Net capital transfeJS from rest of world 5.9 16.0 17.7 16.0 17.8 22.3 
(% of gross domestic product) 
Government saving -3.1 -4.4 -1.5 -2.7 -3.7 -7.9 
Private saving (total) 11.3 17.5 15.8 12.5 11.3 15.2 
Private saving (other) 1.7 8.3 6.7 3.6 3.1 5.7 
Gross domestic savings 8.2 13.4 14.3 9.8 7.5 7.2 
Net savings -1.5 4.0 5.1 0.9 -0.6 2.3 
Net borrowing from rest of world 4.0 1.7 4.3 5.4 13.4 12.8 
Net capital transfers from rest of world 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Source: Department of Statistics. National Income and Product, various issues. 
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Table 5. Jamaica: macro-economic model 
(Two stage least squares estimation) 
Inflation (INFC) 
INFC=0.031 MIPL-0.0023GDPNP+ l.69GUSCIP+0.14GEXAE-3.41 DUMP- 2.55 SE=2.02 DW= 1.46 
(3.06) ( - 2.25) ( 4.97) (2.93) ( - 2.96) ( -2.08) 
Balance of payments (DR) 
DR= 0.007 GDPNP -0.7 MIL+ 85087 CPI - 352.53 CPIL + 0.91 GEXAE - 49.93 SE= 28.77 DW=2.41 
(2.06) ( - 2.39) (2. 79) ( - I. 78) (2.10) ( - 1.32) 
Government expenditures (GE) 
GE = 0.030 GDPNP + 1394. I CPI + 0.48 GEL + I I 0.49 DUMDA - 272.9 SE= 30.68 DW=2.23 
(4.23) (4.84) (2.98) (2.24) 
Government revenues (GR) 
GR =0.025 GDPNP+ I228.24CPI +0.28GRL- 2I2.I8 SE= 30.68 DW=2.23 
(3.04) (6.83) (2.03) (-4.24) 
Real gross domestic product (GDPNP) 
GDPNP = 0.60 M2PL + 2.3I GDPNPL-2.78 GEHEX + 1.71 YHTE- 3997.75 SE= 172.74 DW=2.00 
(2.54) (4.02) (-4.43) (3.20) (-2.27) 
Narrow money (Ml) 
Ml = 1.37 MIL - 75.92 EXAE - 81.79 EXAEL -0.34 R -0.39 RL + 104.43 SE= 18.21 DW=2.9 
(20.21) ( -2.06) ( - 2.69) (2.47) ( - 2. 77) (3.86) 
Broad money (M2) 
M2 = 0.80 M2L - 59.53 EXAE- 131.68 ExAEL + 0.69 R + 0.24 DC+ 117.35 SE= 17.61 DW=2 
(14.40) (-1.91) (-3.07) (5.19) (8.16) (4.00) 
Domestic credit (DC) 
DC = 0.60 DCL + 0.5 I DDCP + 0. 72 GEL + 125.84 DUMD - 45.22 
(4.33) (9.94) (4.06) (-2.50) (-5.50) 
Current account balance of payments (DCA) 
DCA = -0.79 GEHTE + 25.80 GYICL - 230.2 DUMOA + 86.23 
(-3.17) (2.76) (-2.11) (0.78) 
Private investment (IPP) 
IPP = 0.37 DGDPNP- 1.85 GCNPL + 1731.4 DCPIWL + 2217.21 
(2.73) (-7.92) (3.44) (12.82) 
Private consumption (PCNP) 
PCNP = 0.42 GDPNP + 0.80 GCNP - 2860.84 DCPI + 852.88 
(10.10) (4.36) (-4.53) (7.80) 
Government consumption (GCNP) 
GCNP = 0.56 GEHEX - 219.02 
(3.31) (0.67) 
Government investment (IGP) 
IGP = 0.24 GEHEX - 219.02 
(10.00) ( -5.61) 
(GYICL) being the only significant variable for the 
196(}-1981 period (Table 6). For the sub-period 
1969-1981 (Table 7) government expenditures and 
the oil price increases also contributed to the deteri-
oration in the current account (but probably not the 
rise in real foreign interest rates-RRI). As antici-
pated, government consumption had a aegative 
impact on private investment, but contributed to 
increases in real personal consumption expenditure 
during this period. 
OPI'IMUM PATHS OF 
11IE ECONOMY 
The literature [25] on optimal control is highly 
technical, yet the concept itself is straightforward. 
The essential idea of optimal control is to precisely 
derive the optimal policy, in order to steer the 
economy to specified targets deemed desirable to 
policy-makers. 
In examining the model (Table 5), it is clear that 
a package of stabilization measures can obviously 
reduce excess demand in the economy either by a 
policy of squeezing domestic demand or augmenting 
SE=76.44 DW=2 
SE= 127.70 DW = 1.79 
SE= 124.56 DW= 1.68 
SE= 191.59 DW=0.46 
SE= 27.35 DW=0.84 
domestic supply. Prudence and common sense sug-
gest that the best Stabilization strategy for Jamaica 
during this time would have been one that made use 
of an integrated package that sought to maximize the 
benefits or minimize the costs of adjustment. This 
section uses simple simulation experiments to quan-
tify these relationships. 
Specifically, we consider the effects of restraint on 
real government expenditures, exchange rate deval-
uation and supply side policies that raise the level of 
productive capacity. 
For the purposes of the optimal control analysis of 
the IMF stabilization period in Jamaica, the model's 
exogenous variables were set at their actual historical 
values. In the first set of runs, real government 
expenditures were used as the design variable in-
tended to control aggregate demand during the 
period 1977-1980. 
In run I (Table 8) real government expenditures 
were held at their 1976 level, with historical move-
ments in the exchange rate incorporated into the 
calculations. The level of credit to the private sector 
was also assigned its actual values for the 1977-1980 
period. In contrast to the actual developments during 
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Table 6. Jamaica: determinants of the current account balance, 1960--1981 
Independent variables Statistics 
Measure of external 
balance GEHTE GYICL RRI DUMOA ,2 DW F 
I. OTA -0.18 26.27 
(- 1.76) (2.73) 0.243 1.45 4.38 
2. OCA -0.21 30.13 
(-2.08) (3.13) 0.380 2.00 5.84 
3. OCAA -0.20 31.23 
(- 1.82) (3.04) 0.357 1.87 5.27 
4. OCAB -2.00 31.35 
(-1.97) (3.25) 0.389 2.08 6.05 
5. OTA 22.10 -59.86 
(2.19) (-0.18) 0.205 1.47 2.45 
6. OCA 25.4 -58.55 
(2.43) (-0.17) 0.241 3.00 1.90 
7. OCAA 26.64 -56.04 
(2.46) (-0.16) 0.245 1.82 3.09 
8. OCAB 26.77 -16.79 
(3.61) (-0.05) 0.264 1.95 3.42 
9. OTA -0.21 2.90 -23.24 
(- 1.61) (1.77) (-0.40) 0.322 1.44 2.84 
10. OCA -0.22 29.55 -4.02 
(-1.65) (2.27) (-0.07) 0.381 1.99 3.69 
11. OCAB -0.22 27.95 -22.62 
(-1.63) (2.02) ( -0.36) 0.362 3.40 1.84 
12. OCAB -0.19 32.08 5.08 
(-1.48) (2.46) (0.08) 0.389 3.82 2.09 
this period, the simulation results are striking: 5. there is also a decline in inflation to a 19.8% 
I. real income declines by only 2.2% per annum, average increase in the consumer price index, com-
compared with the actual decline of 8.2% per annum; pared with the historical increase of 25.3; and. 
2. private consumption declines by 5.6% per an- 6. finally, the current account averages a positive 
num, as contrasted with an actual decline of9.7% per gain over this period of 3.8 million U.S. dollars, 
compared with the average historical decline of 27.1 
annum; 
million U.S. dollars. 3. perhaps most importantly, private investment 
stabilizes and actually increases by 2.1 % per annum, To determine the level of reduction in government 
compared with the historical 1976-1980 decline of expenditures necessary to stabilize real income at its 
22.4% per annum; 1976 level, runs II and III were performed. In run II, 
4. total foreign reserves increase nearly as well as real government expenditures declined by 1.0% per 
under the IMF programs, reaching 160.4 compared annum during this period while in run II the decline 
with the actual level of 187.0 for 1980; was set at 1.5%. The results indicate that a decline in 
Table 7. Jamaica: determinants of the current account balance, 1969-1981, II 
Independent variables Statistics 
Measure of external 
balance GEHTE GYICL RRI DUMOA ,2 DW F 
I. OTA -0.26 35.27 
( - 1.71) (2.37) 0.389 1.41 3.19 
2. OCA -0.32 45.47 
(-2.30) (3.29) 0.547 2.11 6.04 
3. OCAA -0.31 44.07 
(-1.91) (2.80) 0.464 1.91 4.33 
4. OCAB -0.31 46.00 
(-0.21) (3.29) 0.543 2.21 5.94 
5. OTA 42.42 -1305.34 
(2.37) (- 1.54) 0.361 1.44 2.82 
6. OCA 54.83 -1692.30 
(3.36) (-2.19) 0.532 2.00 5.68 
7. OCAA 51.49 -1488.04 
(2.73) (-1.66) 0.426 1.87 3.72 
8. OCAB 54.60 -1605.31 
(3.28) (-2.03) 0.519 2.09 5.40 
9. OTA -0.82 15.97 -270.71 
(-3.64) (1.20) (-2.89) 0.683 1.87 6.46 
10. OCA -0.79 28.88 -227.40 
(-3.57) (2.21) (-2.46) 0.730 2.60 8.09 
II. OCAA -0.90 22.87 -290.63 
(-3.95) (1.69) (-3.05) 0.736 2.47 8.38 
12. OCAB -0.78 29.31 -228.83 
(-3.50) (-2.45) (-2.44) 0.729 2.66 7.93 
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Table 8. Jamaica: optimal control demand oriented stabilization programs, 1977-1982 
Actual values Optimal control run values for 1981 
Macro-economic indicator 1976 1980 II III IA IB 
Gross domestic (GDPNP) 6693.1 4760.4 6134.2 6471.9 6761.2 6344.8 5872.5 
Private consumption (PCNP) 4676.6 3109.2 3706.5 3819.9 3948.8 3648.4 3737.1 
Private investment (IPP) 940.8 340.9 1020.7 1113.0 1182.0 1078.2 914.1 
Total reserves (R) 29.5 187.0 160.4 137.9 128.7 -119.4 345.7 
Real government expenditures (GEHEX) 1786.2 2351.9 1786.2 1715.9 1681.2 1786.2 1786.2 
Consumer in price index (CPI) 0.406 1.000 0.837 0.829 0.815 0.837 0.731 
Change in current account (DCA) -19.8 -27.1 3.8 18.3 16.1 14.9 23.5 
(Average annual change 1976-1980) 
Gross domestic product -8.2 -2.2 -0.8 -0.3 -1.3 -3.2 
Private consumption -9.7 -5.6 -4.9 -4.1 -6.0 -5.5 
Private investment -22.4 2.1 4.3 5.9 3.5 -0.7 
Total reserves 58.8 52.7 47.0 44.5 -49.9 85.0 
Real government expenditures 7.1 0.0 -1.0 -1.5 0.0 0.0 
Consumer price index 25.3 19.8 19.5 19.0 19.8 15.8 
Notes: See text for assumptions made in each optimal control run. 
The 1980 values for the change in current accounts are the average changes over the 1976-1980 period. 
real government expenditures somewhere between 1.0 · 
and 1.5% would have been consistent with a stable· 
level of real gross domestic product. 
While it might be argued that a more equitable goal 
would have been to stabilize or increase real con-
sumption expenditures, the model indicates that 
growth (measured by real gross domestic product) 
and equity (as measured by real personal con-
sumption expenditures) were not in conflict. In fact, 
maximizing real personal consumption expenditures 
in 1980 instead of real gross national product yielded 
the same growth in government expenditures. Inter-
estingly enough, while the personal consumption 
equation has a positive sign for real government 
expenditures, it turns out that its value is more 
strongly influenced by increases in real gross domestic 
product and the negative impact of inflation. If, in 
fact, government consumption expenditures were un-
dertaken for equity purposes during this period, the 
evidence in runs I through II indicates that these 
programs actually had perverse results. 
In the context of demand management through 
controlling government expenditures, exchange rate 
policy was also examined. Run IA simulates the 
economy under conditions in run I, but without 
devaluation (the 1976 exchange rate held throughout 
the 1976-1980 period). Run IB assumes a once-and-
for-all dramatic devaluation of 100% in 1977. The 
main results of exchange rate oriented policij::s indi-
cate that: 
l. no devaluation appears beneficial to real income 
growth and private investment, but results in a 
serious loss in foreign exchange reserves; 
2. the 100% devaluation, while contributing 
significantly to the country's reserve position, appears 
to significantly impair the growth in real income. 
In general, the simulations indicate purely demand 
related stabilization programs (incorporating ex-
change rate adjustments) place a high cost on the 
domestic economy. While there is evidence that the 
level of income could have at least been stabilized 
during this period through government expenditure 
restraint, it is unlikely that any set of realistically 
structured stabilization programs concentrating ex-
clusively on demand management would have per-
mitted a positive rate of increase in income or living 
standards. 
On the other hand, the model developed above 
indicates that there was ample scope for supply-side 
measures in Jamaica during the 1970s. These supply-
side policies must be specifically directed towards the 
removal of distortions and other structural imped-
iments to rapid economic growth. To the extent that 
. such supply oriented adjustment measures could suc-
ceed in their objective of increasing the capacity level 
of output in Jamaica, the macro-economic model 
developed above indicates that they will also have an 
effect on other major variables in the economy, 
including monetary variables and the balance of 
payments. 
The simulation of the supply side policy traces 
these effects. Given the micro-economic character 
of most supply side policies outlined above, no 
attempt is made here to specify the precise nature of 
the measures that could produce this result. Instead, 
the purpose of this simulation is to determine the 
effects of a given increase in the level of capacity 
output, assuming it can be achieved, on other vari-
ables that are important targets in the stabilization 
program. 
The supply side optimal control programs (Table 
9) were structured to be comparable with the demand 
oriented simulations summarized earlier. In runs IA 
through IID, it is assumed that initiation of the price 
distortion measures during the 1977-1980 period 
were capable of increasing the level of productive 
capacity by 5% per annum--(YHTE) in the gross 
domestic product equation. 
In run IIA with capacity output increasing at 5% 
over its level in the 1977-1980 period and government 
real expenditures held at their 1976 levels the follow-
ing occurred: 
1. real gross domestic product is able to expand by 
2-3% per annum and private investment by 2-7% 
per annum; 
2. there is a dramatic improvement in the current 
account, however, the overall reserve position of 
the country deteriorates somewhat compared with 
the purely demand management program (run I in 
Table 8). 
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Table 9. Jamaica: optimal control supply oriented stabilization programs, 1977-1980 
Actual values Optimal Control Run Values for 1980 
Macro-economic indicator 1976 1980 IIA IIB IIC IID IIE 
Gross domestic product 6693.1 4760.4 7335.2 6993.1 6641.6 5539.5 8536.5 
Private consumption 4676.1 3109.2 4264.5 4131.1 3994.1 3588.5 4818.5 
Private investment 940.8 304.9 1047.5 959.6 861.7 564.3 1076.2 
Total reserves 29.5 187.0 108.0 117.6 128.1 149.6 77.9 
Real government expenditures 1786.2 2351.9 1786.2 1858.7 1933.4 2171.1 1786.2 
Consumer price index 0.405 1.00 0.788 0.807 0.816 0.850 0.743 
Change in current account -19.8 -27.I 39.1 33.9 27.0 10.8 74.8 
(Average annual change 1976-1980) 
Gross domestic product -8.2 2.3 I.I -0.2 -4.6 6.3 
Private consumption -9.7 -2.3 -3.1 -3.9 -6.4 0.8 
Private investment -22.4 2.7 0.5 -2.2 -12.0 3.4 
Total reserves 58.8 38.5 41.3 44.4 50.1 27.5 
Real government expenditure 7.1 0.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 0.0 
Consumer price index 25.3 18.l 18.8 19.I 20.4 16.4 
·J Notes: See text for assumptions made in each optimal control run. 
• 
The 1980 values for the change in current account are the average changes over the 1976-1980 period. 
Increases in the average annual rate of real govern-
ment expenditures above 2% per annum would result 
in a decline in real income albeit some gain in total 
foreign reserves. As might be expected, dramatic 
increases in capacity output (10% per annum) be-
tween 1977 and 1980 produce corresponding gains in 
real output and enable personal consumption to 
stabilize at slightly above its 1976 level (run IIE, 
Table 9). 
CONCLUSIONS 
To summarize, the optimal control simulations 
suggest that all three types of policy measures-
demand management, devaluation, and supply 
management-are "effective" in the sense that they 
have non-negligible effects on the macro-economic 
quantities that are the major target variables of the 
Jamaican stabilization programs. While this conclu-
sion may seem self-evident, it deserves to be reiterated 
because some well-known historical studies of sta-
bilization programs [26] have concluded that ortho-
dox demand management policies were ineffective in 
achieving these objectives, while others have denied 
that supply-oriented policies can play any significant 
role in economic stabilization programs. 
More importantly, this analysis shows that al-
though the three policies have somewhat similar 
impact on the overall balance of payments and 
international reserves, both the direction and the time 
pattern of their effects on other important variables-
particularly prices, output and consumption-are 
quite different. This suggests that it would have been 
possible to find a combination of policy measures 
that would have allowed the Jamaican authorities to 
achieve their major objectives at a smaller cost, in 
terms of undesired changes in other important eco-
nomic indices, than the program actually undertaken. 
Finally, the simulation results clearly show that 
successful supply-side policies could have mitigated 
the adverse income effects of stabilization via demand 
restraint. However, given the current state of the art, 
the difficult practical question of exactly how supply 
management policies could have been implemented 
and how long they might have taken to achieve their 
effect remains unresolved. 
REFERENCES 
1. A shorter and more generalized model of this type has 
been developed by the IMF. M. Khan and M. Knight. 
Stabilization programs in developing countries: a for-
mal framework. IMF Staff Papers pp. 1-53, (March 
1981). M. Khan and M. Knight. Some theoretical and 
empirical issues relating to economic stabilization in 
developing countries. Wld Dev. 709-730 (1982). 
2. National income accounts and monetary data ari: for 
the period 1953-1982; government finance data are for 
the period 1960-1979; current account figures are for 
1960--1981. All are taken from: IMF, International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook 1983. Government and 
private investment figures are for the period 1969--1982 
and are taken from Department of Statistics, National 
Income and Product, various issues. 
3. Steven Goldman. Hyperinflation and the rate of growth 
in the money supply. J. Econ. Theory 250--257 (October 
1972). 
4. David Laidler. The Demand for Money: Theories and 
Evidence. New York (1977). 
5. M. Khan. Monetary shocks and the dynamics of 
inflation. IMF Staff Papers, 250--284 (June 1980). 
6. D. Laidler and P. O'Shea. An empirical macro-model of 
an open economy under fixed exchange rates: the 
United Kingdom, 1954-1970. Economica 141-158 (May 
1980). 
7. B. Aghevli and M. Khan. Government deficits and the 
inflationary process in developing countries. IMF Staff 
Paperi, 383-416 (September 1978). 
8. Adlith Brown. Economic policy and the IMF in 
Jamaica. Social and Economic Studies, p. 32 (December 
1981). 
9. F. A. Harberger. The dynamics of inflation in Chile. In 
Measurements in Economics: Studies in Mathematical 
Economics and Econometrics in Memory of Yehuda 
Grunfeld. Stanford University Press, Stanford (1983). 
10. R. Barro. Unanticipated money, output and the price 
level in the United States. J. Political Econ. 549--80 
(August 1978). 
11. Another proxy for expected inflation that commonly 
used the difference between the actual rate of inflation 
in the previous period and the rate that was expected to 
prevail in the period did not yield statistically significant 
results. P. Cagan. The monetary studies of 
hyperinflation. In Studies in the Quantity Theory of 
Money (Edited by M. Friedman), pp. 25-117. Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, Chicago (1956). 
12. Gladstone Bonnick. Jamaica: liberalization to central-
ization and back? In World Economic Growth (Edited by 
352 ROBERT E. LooNEY 
A. C. Harberger), p. 32. Institute of Contemporary 
Studies. San Francisco (1984). 
13. The equation is based on a generalized version given in 
M. Khan and M. Knight. Determinants of the current ' 
account balances of non-oil developing countries in the 
1970s. IMF Staff Papers, pp. 819-842 (December 1983). 
14. J. Sharpley. Economic management and the IMF in 
Jamaica, 1972-1980. DERAP Working Paper A-232 
p. 10 (September 1981). 
15. DeLeslie Worrell. External influences and domestic 
policies: the economies of Barbados and Jamaica in the 
1970s. Social and Economic Studies, p. 11 (December 
1981). 
16. M. Khan and M. Knight. Some theoretical and 
empirical issues relating to economic stabilization in 
developing countries. Wld Dev. 718 (1982). 
17. Compton Bourne. Jamaica and the international mon-
etary fund: economics of the 1978 stabilization pro-
gram. Agricultural Finance Program, Department of 
Agriculture Economics and Rural Sociology. Ohio State 
University Economics and Sociology Occasional Paper 
No. 729, p. 17 (May 29, 1980). 
18. Ibid. 
19. Brown. op. cit. p. 26. 
20. Ibid. 
21. An alternative approach is to use the current rate of 
domestic inflation. N. Leff and K. Sato. Macro-
economic adjustment in developing countries: in-
stability, short run growth and external dependency. 
Review of Economics and Statistics (1978). 
22. Bourne. op. cit. p. 17. 
23. The program and its description are given in B. Hall and 
R. Hall. Time Series Processor, Version 3.5, User's 
Manual (Stanford, 1980). 
24. I-Statistics are given in parenthesis under the variables 
while SE = standard error of the regression and 
DW =Durbin-Watson statistic. 
25. A good, non-technical description is given in R. Pin-
dyck. Optimal Planning for Economic Stabilization: An 
Application of Control Theory to Stabilization Policy. 
North Holland, Amsterdam (1973). 
26. Foxley. op. cit. 
